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THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CON-
STRUCTION OF VICTIMS. By Kristin Bumiller.1 Balti-
more, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1988. Pp. 
161. $19.95. 
William R. Beer 2 
In For Whom the Bell Tolls, Ernest Hemingway has his hero, 
Robert Jordan, tell of a conversation with a Russian NKVD officer 
who sent Jordan on his mission to direct a guerrilla raid. The Rus-
sian says that in his homeland there are two kinds of fools, the sum-
mer fool and the winter fool. The summer fool walks down the 
street on a summer day, grimacing and waving his arms; it is easy 
for everybody to see right away that he is a fool. The winter fool 
comes to your home on a stormy day, and enters, covered with 
snow. He shakes the snow off his boots and removes them. He 
shakes the snow off his gloves and removes them. He shakes the 
snow off his hat after taking it off, and finally shakes the snow off 
his overcoat. Finally he takes off the overcoat and you discover, 
only after all that uncovering, that he is a fool. 
Professor Kristin Bumiller reminds me of the latter sort of 
fool; underneath all the legalistic terminology, Marxist slogans, and 
talk about "Foucaultian" analysis and "Beccarian" ideas, hers is a 
very simple thesis, to wit: Laws are made by ruling classes, so laws 
claiming to reform society really only serve to perpetuate the very 
injustices they aim to erase. This is true, she argues, of American 
civil rights laws as they apply to blacks, and also of the situation of 
any number of other "oppressed" people, such as women, the eld-
erly, Hispanics, and whoever else is the latest victim of the day. 
This is the sort of argument that could be made by the average col-
lege sophomore who has read The Communist Manifesto. 
In order to advance her thesis, she indulges in a breathtaking 
perversion of everything that true social science stands for. Science, 
in the normally accepted meaning of the term, comprises a search 
for general rules of cause and effect through testing of hypotheses 
by empirical observation. Professor Bumiller's approach is, by con-
trast, so biased and selective that it cannot be distinguished from 
pamphleteering. In short, the book is an excellent example of Criti-
cal Legal Studies, and should be read by anybody who doubts just 
I. Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University. 
2. Professor of Sociology, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. 
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how far removed from reality today's left-wing legal scholars have 
become. 
"My analysis," says Bumiller, "begins with the assumption 
that racism and sexism are prevalent, and is sympathetic to those 
who are impatient with the current rate of progress toward a more 
egalitarian society." If she is using "discrimination" in the ordinary 
sense, her basic assumption is false; a large majority of American 
women say they have never suffered from sex discrimination, and 
large majorities of blacks say they have never suffered from racial 
discrimination in hiring, housing, and education. Of course, one 
might surmise that they are wrong, either because they have been 
brainwashed or because the discrimination has been veiled in vari-
ous ways. Such a theory would not necessarily be valid, but it 
would at least have a degree of plausibility. But individual exper-
iences of sexual and racial discrimination are not what Bumiller 
means when she talks of racism and sexism. What she means-and 
in this she is joined by most leftist and liberal social scientists-is 
that there are group differences between the situation of blacks and 
that of whites, or between that of women and that of men: "dis-
crimination" means inequality. 
For example, commentators often cite statistical disparities in 
income and occupational mobility between females and males or 
whites and blacks. Now, when you start trying to prove things with 
statistics, you need some understanding of basic social science 
methodology. But Critical Legal Studies exemplars like Bumiller 
come crashing into the thickets of sociology without any clear un-
derstanding of what they are talking about. 
Particularly absurd is her deliberate and repeated confusion of 
"women" and "minorities." That women constitute an enormously 
heterogeneous category with no internal cohesion is evident to any-
one but a polemicist. What does she mean by "minorities"? Does 
she include Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans, who have 
higher median family incomes than any white ethnic group? Does 
she include white ethnic groups such as the Scotch Irish, whose in-
comes tend to be very modest in comparison to other white ethnic 
groups? What she probably means is black Americans and non-
Cuban Hispanics, lumped together with "women" as some huge op-
pressed class for propaganda purposes. No honest social scientist 
can take this kind of confusion seriously. 
Just as serious as Bumiller's conceptual crudity are the factual 
errors she makes. The book is chock-full of statements that are er-
roneous, unsubstantiated, or both. For example, she says that 
among groups who experience discrimination, there is "a sense of 
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how little things have changed." Any number of surveys provide 
objective data indicating that this is simply false. In the 1983 New 
York Times Women's Survey, in response to the question, "In the 
last ten years or so, do you think men's attitudes towards women 
have changed for the better?", 51% of the women responding said 
"yes." And 50% said that there had been a "great deal" of progress 
"in the movement of women into jobs that used to only be thought 
of as only jobs for men." Only 8% said there had been "not much 
progress." In a February 1988 Gallup poll, 47% of American 
blacks said their work situation had improved in the previous five 
years, 54% acknowledged improvement in their pay and 41% in 
their housing situation; these perceptions of positive change were 
virtually indistinguishable from the figures for whites. It seems evi-
dent that the lack of change is more in Bumiller's own mind than in 
the minds of those for whom she purports to speak. 
She claims that there are "significant gaps in white versus 
black or female wages that are due to employers' 'taste for discrimi-
nation,' " but the facts are otherwise. When one controls for family 
structure, level of education, age, region and urban/rural residence, 
the differences in median black and white family incomes virtually 
disappear, and this has been so for over a decade. It is commonly 
acknowledged nowadays among social scientists that contemporary 
racial discrimination does not explain black social problems. As for 
male-female differences in income, even the authors of a study that 
explicitly sought to demonstrate that discrimination accounted for 
differences in male and female wages were forced to concede that 
definitive proof was lacking.3 
Bumiller's interpretations of data are just as skewed as her 
"facts." She tacitly follows a simple rule: Anywhere there is a sta-
tistical disparity between a group and some hypothetical national 
norm, this is prima facie evidence of discrimination. No other ex-
planation for different levels of achievement between groups is even 
briefly considered. If there are fewer blacks in the professions, if 
there are more black than white high school dropouts or felons, if 
fewer women enter mathematically-oriented occupations, if a cer-
tain ethnic group is predominant in a particular field, Bumiller can-
not conceive of any other explanation than discrimination. Indeed, 
this pattern of thought has become so common in elite thinking that 
a statistical disparity is considered to be extremely strong evidence 
of discrimination. 
Myriad factors besides discrimination can account for these 
group disparities. What impelled a group to come to the United 
3. D. TREIMAN & H. HARTMAN, WoMEN, WORK AND WAGES (1981). 
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States (expulsion, ambition, involuntary servitude), what stage of 
economic development our society had achieved when the group 
migrated here, what level of education the group had prior to mi-
gration, whether or not the group's native language was English, 
whether the group was the beneficiary of welfare programs that may 
have undermined its communal and familial institutions, whether 
its religion encourages or discourages economic enterprise and/or 
education-these and many other factors influence the success or 
failure of ethnic groups. To be sure, discrimination unfortunately 
does play some role in producing statistical disparities between dif-
ferent groups' income levels, but only as one among many factors. 
Bumiller attempts to prove her thesis by interviewing several 
people and assessing their statements about their experience with 
racial or sexual discrimination. This is a time-honored method, 
provided that the respondents are chosen in an unbiased way, the 
questions put to them are standardized and do not lead them in 
preconceived directions, their testimony is presented to the reader 
so that he can judge for himself, and no attempt is made to interpret 
the data beyond the scope of the experience of the respondents. 
Bumiller, however, violates every one of these provisos. Her 
sample was deliberately selected to corroborate her own point of 
view. "I selected," she says, "a subsample of eighteen persons in 
Milwaukee and Los Angeles for in-depth interviewing," out of a 
total sample of five hundred sixty people interviewed by a research 
enterprise called the Civil Litigation Research Project in 1980. 
"The participants in the interviews were representative of those af-
fected by the social inequalities and the pattern of discrimination in 
American society: six black and American Indian men." Such a 
sample is, of course, "representative" of nothing but Bumiller's own 
ideological agenda and, maybe, her travel plans-she says that the 
"selection was dependent upon the geographical constraints on the 
investigator." Competent social scientists take the notion of a "rep-
resentative" sample seriously; there are statistical tests for precisely 
measuring this characteristic of a sample. Evidently Bumiller is ig-
norant of these procedures. 
Bumiller does not simply interview her subjects; she interprets 
their answers for them because "[t]he reality of the subject does not 
allow for a social viewpoint distinct from the ideology of those in 
authority." To justify this interpolation she claims that the ideol-
ogy of the ruling class is so pervasive that victims do not know how 
to answer questions in such a way as to express their true interests. 
Therefore, it is necessary to interpret what her interviewees say in 
order to express what they "really" mean. "I attempt to transform 
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the act of interviewing from ritual into meaningful exchange by for-
mulating objectives that bring together the knowledge of the re-
spondent with a perspective on legal ideology." Why does she 
follow this bizarre procedure? "This work is motivated by the de-
sire to make social science research more responsive to the problem 
of social oppression and the stultifying realities of everyday life." 
Underneath all the pompous verbiage, the simple fact is that if sci-
entific research doesn't uncover the oppression Bumiller knows is 
there, she will add some creative touches to make sure we see it. 
All this would be shabby enough. But she then neglects to lay 
the full text of her respondents' statements in front of the reader. 
Bumiller cannot allow even this highly selected and polemically in-
terrogated sample of subjects to speak for themselves. A phrase or 
two is quoted here and there, but the entire transcript of the inter-
views is digested by the author, and she simply tells us the gist (in 
her mind) of what each respondent said. The "victim" isn't allowed 
to speak for himself, and the reader isn't allowed to interpret for 
himself. 
As social science, then, the book is laughable. It can be taken 
seriously, however, as an ideological statement, and in this respect it 
is instructive. From her point of view the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and its subsequent interpretations and implementations were unde-
sirable because they expressed a reformist promise to the "op-
pressed" that peaceful change is possible under capitalism. In her 
words, "The deep logic of the law does not reflect the complex so-
cial reality of discrimination in society, but rather confines legal res-
olution to social problems appropriate for litigation." This is bad, 
because "the legal logic is directed to limiting social transformation 
rather than facilitating it." What she prefers is a solution in which 
the state intervenes at every level of citizens' lives, abolishing capi-
talism and bourgeois privacy. In her words, "The public policy tug 
of war stretches the line between high and low levels of governmen-
tal intervention, yet never questions the basic integrity of the eco-
nomic market or the reality of personal lives." The policy debate is 
too limited because it "assumes that restructuring society to prevent 
the reinforcement of hierarchies is impractical or undesirable." 
She is right that the civil rights legislation sponsored by welfare 
state liberals has been a failure. But the failure has resulted from 
methodological and theoretical problems she shares with the same 
social engineers whom she attacks. Their intellectual errors have 
had grievous social consequences. I will point out only one of 
many. 
Treating "blacks" and "whites" and "women" and "men" and 
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"minorities" as if they were undifferentiated groups rather than in-
dividuals is more than just sociologically naive. It has led to the 
establishment of a quota system for ethnic groups that pervades 
public and private institutions under "affirmative action" guide-
lines. But the damage is not restricted to racial and sexual quotas. 
It extends to the area of Western culture itself. As the recent exam-
ple of Stanford University shows, left-wing intellectuals are de-
manding the inclusion of works of women and "people of color" in 
courses on Western civilization, not by dint of their intrinsic quality 
but because of the race or sex of their authors. The end result is not 
simply the balkanization of American society but the balkanization 
of Western culture. Henceforth, we may expect that Leonardo Da 
Vinci will be subsumed under the category of "gay artist," while 
Mme. de Stael will be part of the quota of "women writers." The 
value of individual achievement, which is itself the greatest legacy 
of the West, is being rapidly wiped out by the civil rights society's 
mentality. 
One final aspect of the book is also of interest. A revealing 
look at the relation between elite institutions and the kind of aca-
demic radicalism espoused by Bumiller is provided by her acknowl-
edgement of resources that supported her research. The book is 
based in part on a survey carried out by the Civil Litigation Re-
search Project, under the auspices of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. While she was writing it she was supported by a graduate 
fellowship at Madison, by released time at Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, and as a Liberal Arts Fellow in Law and Political Science at 
Harvard Law School. That such establishment institutions should 
support her illustrates, if illustration were needed, the extent to 
which the intellectual elite in the United States is in thrall to far-left 
ideology. It also contrasts grotesquely with her revolutionary 
pretensions. It must be tough to keep the stance of brave militant 
against the powers that be, when the powers that be are so entirely 
accommodating. What is more, that such august agencies should 
have supported such mighty labors to produce such a negligible 
book is ludicrous. 
In summary, there is, as the saying goes among reporters, a 
good story here, but Bumiller has not written it. The "civil rights 
society" has failed, but not for the reasons Bumiller so murkily ar-
gues. The civil rights movement, in surely one of the great mo-
ments in American history, succeeded in shaking loose the foul 
encrustations of decades of racial segregation throughout the South. 
It succeeded so spectacularly that the federal government came to 
acknowledge that it had the responsibility to guarantee all citizens 
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the right to vote and to use public accommodations. But as soon as 
the government bureaucracy was created, something went disas-
trously wrong, and feminists, leftists, spokesmen for sundry ethnic 
constituencies, not to mention homosexuals and others, all leaped 
on the "civil rights" bandwagon. The result is a monstrous machin-
ery of preferential treatment, quotas, and discrimination-as-revenge. 
The "civil rights society" is a thicket of contradictory and often 
incomprehensible legal and bureaucratic regulations that require 
everyone-employers, university deans, school admissions commit-
tees, and citizens themselves-to classify people on the basis of soci-
ologically dubious categories of oppression. The Rehnquist Court is 
trying to change some of this, but it remains to be seen how much 
mere judges can do. Given the universities' willingness to employ 
the "diversity" subterfuge, and Congress's power to grant outright 
racial set-asides, it seems likely that our racial spoils system will 
endure. 
The end result is to make all Americans far more cynical about 
civil rights. Some people have always been successful because they 
cut comers and used connections, but now the government itself 
explicitly and unashamedly cuts comers and makes connections for 
those who come from certain racial groups. Young people today 
know that more than ever success is a question of belonging to the 
right category-sex, race, ethnic group-and that such stacking of 
the decks is not only common but legal. That is the real tragedy 
that has resulted from the failure of the "civil rights society," but 
the full accounting of that tragedy has not been written. 
THE TENTH JUSTICE. By Lincoln Caplan.' New York, 
N.Y.: Alfred E. Knopf. 1987. Pp. x, 340. $19.95. 
Brian K. Landsberg 2 
This is a book with a split personality. Dr. Jekyll provides a 
slightly romanticized but basically sound history, description, and 
analysis of the role of the Solicitor General. Mr. Hyde transforms 
the book into a polemic against the Reagan-era solicitors general, 
relying on journalistic techniques popularized by Woodward and 
Armstrong in The Brethren. Combining the two detracts from a 
generally informative book. One comes to feel the Dr. Jekyll por-
I. J.D., Harvard Law School. 
2. Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Chief, Ap-
pellate Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice, 1974-1986. 
